Swarthmore College

Works
Political Science Faculty Works

Political Science

2000

Political Economy Of Foreign Aid
Raymond F. Hopkins
Swarthmore College, rhopkin1@swarthmore.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-poli-sci
Part of the Political Science Commons

Let us know how access to these works benefits you

Recommended Citation
Raymond F. Hopkins. (2000). "Political Economy Of Foreign Aid". Foreign Aid Development: Lessons
Learnt And Directions For The Future. 423-449.
https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-poli-sci/249

This work is brought to you for free by Swarthmore College Libraries' Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Political Science Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of Works. For more information, please contact
myworks@swarthmore.edu.

19 Political economy of
foreign aid
Raymond E Hopkins*

Introduction
The future of foreign aid is precarious. With aid in decline, violence in
developing countries' on the rise, and Western countries' interests in global
outreach increasingly uncertain, a new formula for relations between
donors and aid receiving countries is evolving. Countries with the greatest
need are also the ones most troubled by weak institutions and political
upheavals. Such recipients need more effective governments. This demand
is voiced in this volume and elsewhere. It fuels aid in support of state
strengthening. The rise of aid for capacity building, governance and demo
cracy, however, poses a major dilemma. On the one hand, institutional
weakness is recognised as a major barrier to aid effectiveness. On the other
hand, donor efforts to link aid to improved governance compete with
recipients' preferences to protect existing privileges. Weak states do not
readily use aid to improve their polities or economy. The central task for
the changing aid regime is to develop strategies to resolve this dilemma.
The post-cold war aid regime requires a formula for aid that goes bey ond
conventional econo�jc liberalism to support the strengthening of states
burdened with faile9'institutions.
As noted in Chapter 3, the share of GNP that rich countries contribute to
official development assistance is in decline, in some states for over 20
years. In spite of the increased generosity of some states, since 1992 net aid
disbursements from OECD states dropped, falling from over $62 billion to
less than $50 billion in 1997. Not surprisingly, this decline has spawned
interest in what caused it and what will happen in the future. This chapter
addresses these questions. Drawing on the earlier contributions to the
volume, it explores conditions influencing future bilateral and multilateral
aid, with principal attention to large donor states, since their outlooks
shape their own as well as multilateral flows.
In addressing these questions, this chapter focuses principally on political
explanations. Previous chapters mainly addressed the economic dimensions
of aid. They asked how its performance as an instrument for development
could be improved. Only occasional attention was paid to political economy
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issues, such as how politics influences the allocations and results of aid. Yet
some grasp of why richer countries are willing to transfer resources to poor
countries is essential to any credible forecast about future aid flows. Further,
since aid supplies are contingent on results, and on the willingness of
recipients to accede to aid conditions, the political motivations of those in
control of recipient governments, as well as those with power in donor
states, must be considered. Together these factors determine the allocation
and use of aid. 1 In considering the causes of aid, and reflecting on what
causal conditions support foreign aid, political economy perspectives are
useful. A political economy perspective treats aid as a policy action of
donors, to be explained by political and economic goals. These, in turn, are
products of culture, institutions, power distribution and the dynamics of
competitive interests (Gilpin I 987, Nelson 1990, Cassen et al. 1994 and
Schraeder et al. 1998).
There are various traditions in political economy, ranging from economic
determinism and rational choice modelling to idea-grounded social
constructivism (Mueller 1997, Bates 1998 and Staniland 1985 ). This essay
draws on at least three approaches. In one, foreign aid is determined by the
economic interests of powerful groups within donor countries. Executive
and legislative branches make economic policy with a view to its implic
ations for their power. The second approach explains aid (bilateral and
multilateral) as an effort to maximise benefits to donor states, deriving
preferences for them from their situation in the international system. In
the third, aid is the outcome of bargaining among units, a kind of political
market made up of donor aid bureaucracies, multilateral aid agencies and
recipient government officials. All three help explain donor motivations.
Since preference formation and estimation is controversial, this essay relies
little on formal models or deductions from assumed interests. It uses
historical language to speak of motivations and goals (not preferences and
strategies), particularly for donors. Motivations are discussed as emergent
properties from social context.
In the first approach, groups within states - e.g. parties, sectors, firms
and NGOs - press for various policies. Empirical evidence about how various
unbundled components of a state see their interests affected by aid is the
basis for explaining aid outcomes. Political leaders, interacting within
executive and legislative branches, set policy on levels and allocations of
aid. Bureaucracies and personalities seek to improve their situation by
strategic uses of aid; patronage and short-term solutions often dominate
choices (Nelson and Eglinton 1993 and van de Walle 1998).
In the second approach, the state is a unified actor with interests. These
interests arise from a state's position in world affairs and its cultural values.
Aid is used to advance interests, whether diplomatic, commercial or cultural.
Because donors pursue multiple goals, and these vary over time and
among donors, it is difficult to generalise about the weight these goals play
in explaining aid. For example, economic gains seem important in Japanese
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aid, political goals in French aid and global welfare improvement in Nordic
aid (Chapter 3).
In the third approach, producers and consumers of foreign aid set terms
(prices) by bargaining. Units remain state or government agencies, but in
interaction. Donors want a bundle of outcomes in return for their aid. One
outcome is from other donors. In this context they want burden sharing
and co-ordination to achieve common goals. Among recipients, donors
want compliance with their conditions. Recipients, of course, want aid
without conditions. Donor-recipient exchanges can be considered strategic
results of co-operative bargaining games. Acceptable outcomes for players
are aid arrangements within each player's win set, varying according to
which side pulls the other closest to its preferred position (Putnam 1988).
As world political conditions change, foreign aid changes: both its size
and purposes. There has never been a pure economic development
assistance regime. Rather, foreign policy has created and sustained various
aid regimes among donors (Grant and Nijman 1998). Until 1990, cold war
concerns provided a core motivation for aid. Recipient states did not fail
because it was in the interests of the cold war combatants that they not fail.
Development was a secondary concern; rentier elites were not obliged to
account to donors for aid effectiveness in terms of economic or political
improvements. Now that the cold war is over, foreign policy is more geared
towards international public goods, including containing international
'bads'. Ironically, international public 'bads' have multiplied as states once
propped-up by strategically motivated aid are now openly failing. This
situation provides a new focus for aid efforts. Donors should intervene in
crisis situations (see Chapter 17), so as to contain negative externalities and
gear their assistance in normal times to institution building. In the short
term, the donor objective is not higher economic growth in aid recipients;
if it were, aid would go to countries with competent states and good
policies, ones already relatively rich and able to attract private investment. 2
The priority for aid in the first decade of the twenty-first century should be
for institutionalising political stability, seeking the best package of long
term reduction in political crises and better future economic growth among
states too risky for private sector funds. It is not an easy task.

Explaining the decline in aid
Explaining the change in aid volumes, and especially its decline in the
1990s, begins with recalling how the system of foreign aid evolved over its
first 50 years, as reviewed in Chapters 1 and 3. The institutionalisation of
foreign aid after the Second World War occurred in a context of the cold
war. Welfare principles dominated economic policies of donors (Noel and
Therien 1995). Strategic political considerations were the major force
shaping aid allocations, at least bilateral ones (Wood 1986 and Ruttan
1996). While moral concerns underlay aid, especially emergency relief, this
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motivation was never paramount, certainly not in a sustainable fashion. 3
These founding principles and regime features changed. The demise of the
United States as a hegemonic donor was reflected in the drop of us aid as a
percentage of us GNP, from over 2 per cent in 1950 (not shown in the
figure), to about 0.6 per cent in 1960-2, and only 0.08 per cent in 1997
(see Figure 19.1).4
Multilateral agencies played a growing role in the regime, as the World
Bank and the UNDP facilitated co-ordination in aid administration, while
the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD encouraged
more generous giving among its member countries, along with establishing
guidelines for what counted as aid. From the 1960s to 1992, the amount of
official development assistance rose steadily, even taking inflation into
account (see Chapter 3). It centred increasingly on impoverished countries,
as successful developing states in Latin America and Asia 'graduated' as
recipients. Japanese and European aid especially increased, surpassing us
contributions. Equitable development and economic reform became more
central principles for justifying aid. Then, following the end of the cold
war, with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, funding peaked and
declined.
The decline in foreign aid occurred for six reasons. First, the end of the
cold war made it less important. Second, globalisation attenuated aid tied
to colonial interests. Third, growing budget pressures squeezed donor
resources. Fourth, disappointment with the effectiveness of aid weakened
popular support. Fifth, donor country special interest coalitions supporting
aid unravelled. Finally, neo-liberal philosophies challenged some of the
intellectual foundations of aid. A brief elaboration of these reasons follows.
Cold war ending
The end of the cold war reduced both aid and the ability of recipients to
manoeuver among donors. In donors most engaged in the cold war
struggle, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, domestic
support for aid evaporated with the end of the global ideological clash.
Predictably, among OECD members, the largest declines in aid since 1992
are reported for the United States, followed by close military allies Germany,
Japan and Australia. The declines in aid from 1992 to 1998 for each of the
OECD countries corresponds fairly well to a rank ordering of countries in
terms of the intensity of their involvement in cold war activities. The
erosion of cold war motivations did not affect all of these donors. In the
1980s, for example, nonaligned states, such as Finland and Switzerland,
did not use aid for strategic purposes. They also avoided substantial
decline in the 1990s. Nominal cold war alignments, moreover, such as NATO
membership, are not a good proxy for strategic motivation of foreign aid.
Those states that accepted (and have reached and surpassed) the UN aid
volume target (0. 7 per cent of donor GNP) in their national policy, had both
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the least decline in terms of aid volume (Figure 19.2), in terms of their
relative aid effort (Figure 19.1) and the least responsibility for the cold war
world structure.5
Aid from China and Russia, and other former communist states, also
declined. These states give little or no aid today. This decline, likewise, is a
function, at least partially, of the cold war's demise. Many of these states
have become aid recipients. Their role in the aid drama today stands in
striking comparison to their role in the 1955-80 era. Once significant
contributors to the aid regime (Schraeder et al. 1998), these states now
absorb billions of aid monies in efforts to transform their economies from
command to market based ones and to encourage their peaceful transition
into a global liberal economy (Grant and Nijman 1998). The rise in aid to
these recipients basically absorbed aid increases after 1989; from the mid
l 990s this put pressure on the availability of development aid for tradi
tional poor countries. 6
The case of aid to the Horn of Africa is instructive. In spite of large
needs, foreign aid has declined. From the 1960s to the 1980s, cold war
alliances were the major factor shaping aid flows to that area. In the 1980s
Somalia and Sudan received large amounts of us aid as a product of
alignments. Ethiopia, following the rise to power there of Marxist military
leaders, lost foreign aid from the West. Today, global alliances do not
mobilise or direct aid.
In sum, the end of the cold war both reduced support for aid and
loosened constraints on its use. From 1948 until 1991, the great risk to
security from a war between the two large alliances caused each side to
mobilise and use aid as a tool to shape relations with other states. Aid
continues today for other reasons. 7 As security-based incentives declined,
overall aid did not fall immediately; and for certain donors with com
mercial or global welfare interests aid grew.
Dying patron-client ties
A second reason for declining aid levels is the atrophying of international
patron-client relations. Globalisation of economic and cultural production
has subordinated links originating in earlier colonial ties and spheres of
influence. For great powers, these ties, which pre-date the cold war, were
important in justifying and allocating aid in the 1950s and 1960s. The
desire of France and Britain to maintain economic and cultural links with
former colonies, and similar desires by the United States with respect to
areas it formerly governed or strongly controlled, such as the Philippines,
Liberia and Panama, encouraged aid that could provide direct budgetary
support to friendly governments. The French focus on states in West Africa
is particularly revealing. French ties to West Africa were not part of a
strategic alliance, but represented the protection of historical investments
in overseas peoples and expatriate residents. Aid supported a network of
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commercial and cultural links. The aim was to build political stability in
those countries with which France shared historical and linguistic identities
(Schraeder et al. 1998). A review of aid to six West African states in 1987-91
by the French ministry of co-operation concluded that 'France's develop
ment aid contributed to the reproduction of social economic and political
systems that are clientist and predatory.' (quoted in Lancaster 1999: 121).
In the 1990s these culturally based political and economic links have
weakened as donor country firms responded to global and Europe-wide
market imperatives. Popular interest in these overseas locales also waned as
global humanitarian opportunities captured the attention of large NGOs. A
residue of support for client-maintenance remains; French aid continues to
be concentrated, for example. The United States continues to give aid to
countries with special ties, but without emphasis on maintaining solidarity
of customs. A decline in client-oriented aid is notable in the case of the
United Kingdom. It has loosened its targeting of aid to former colonies,
reacting to a vocal development lobby and strong support of the Labour
party. Portugal and the Netherlands also have historical ties that promote
aid. Other donors have developed a target group of countries based on
shared political philosophy, as in the case of Nordic states with Tanzania.
The special sentiments linking particular donors and recipients, whatever
their origin, have withered in recent y ears, especially as experiences of
success dropped.
One result of this withering of sentiments is diminished aid to 'client'
governments. This, in turn, has reduced aid's role in stabilising these polities.
Of course, this role is controversial. Aid to train police and military, or to
bolster a particular set of officials, is of debatable value, witness such aid to
Vietnam in the 1960s or Somalia and Zaire in the 1970s. Further, in Africa,
where aid rose dramatically in the wake of fiscal crises, famines, and
devastating civil wars in Uganda, Chad and Mozambique, more aid actually
weakened the polity. The proliferation of donors with individual projects
created a complex nightmare of planning, oversight, evaluation and negoti
ation in weak states. Donor demands overwhelmed government capacity.
Some political uses of aid to promote stability continue. For instance, aid
still goes to help stabilise countries or regions, such as the Middle East,
Eastern Europe or Southern Africa. Some aid may go as a bulwark against
terrorism. Such flows are donor specific. Aid from the United States to
Egypt and Israel and European aid to Eastern Europe and Russia stand out
as examples. Japan's aid to Asia may also play such a role, though it rests
more on commercial and regional stability interests. Bilateral aid to prop
up particular client states, however, is over (Ruttan 1996 and Lancaster
1999). Furthermore, multilateral aid is harder to use for state support, even
though technical assistance from the World Bank or UNDP is specifically
designed for capacity building (see also Chapters 6 and 12). While multi
lateral agencies are often more trusted by recipients, they are less able to
exercise political conditionality, certainly overtly. Multilateral agencies have
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charters and governing bodies with strong respect for putative sovereignty.
This inhibits aid used to prop up governments, or to force political reform.
Their failure in this task has been broadly assailed (van de Walle 1998).
Tight budgets
A third reason for the decline of aid is budgetary constraints. Many OECD
governments reduced their aid in the 1990s, at least from trend levels, a
likely consequence of broader efforts to lower government deficits. Both
domestic and foreign expenditures came under pressure. Military spending
and foreign aid suffered cuts, many in absolute terms. Entitlement pro
grammes expanded, gaining a larger share of allocations, even as benefit
levels for such programmes were tightened. Reasons for this tightening
varied. Among European countries, the decision to meet the Maastricht
treaty's criteria for entering the Euro-currency arrangement required
substantial shrinking in budget deficits in the y ears leading up to January
1999. Slow economic growth made the fiscal cuts required particularly
painful. Some were dramatic. In Italy, for example, after large increases in
aid, budget pressures in the 1990s,_ combined with disappointment about
fraud and waste in projects, brought about a fall in Italian aid of over 50
per cent. In the United States, aid declines since the 1980s can be linked to
tax cuts and legislatively mandated caps on budget expenditures. Once the
Clinton administration promoted a balanced budget goal, austerity across a
large realm of discretionary expenditures ensued. In Japan, which became
the largest single donor in 1992, aid declined by over 30 per cent from
1995 to 1996. The collapse of the balloon economy and the subsequent
long recession explain a large part of Japanese aid downturn. The fiscal
reform law of December 1997 schedules aid volumes to fall from 1997
levels by 10 per cent a year from 1998-2000. In the face of this austerity,
aid from conservative welfare states declined the most and from socialist
welfare states the least (Noel and Therien 1995).
Budget constraints also affected non-OECD donors. Falling government
revenues in oil-rich Middle East states explain their budget induced decline.
These countries, so heavily dependent on export revenues from oil,
encountered budget crises in the 1990s as world prices plummeted. Since
the Gulf War, the flow of aid from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other smaller
neighbours has dwindled. At one time, in the 1970s, these donors funded
5-10 per cent of total aid commitments. Today there are few aid donors
outside the OECD. The small amounts of aid provided by countries such as
Argentina, Taiwan and Brazil are dwarfed by other aid flows.
Poor performance
The fourth reason for the decline in aid volumes is disappointment with
performance. Sometimes labelled 'aid fatigue', this factor is best understood
as lack of satisfaction that aid is working. Aid has been seen to fail in many
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countries, especially in Africa. The failure of economic development in some
countries, ones increasingly targeted for aid in the 1980s, was particularly
disappointing.8 Some analysts blamed failure on donor governments,
pointing out that they had undercut development results by giving priority to
other donor state purposes, particularly political and commercial interests. 9
There have long been critics of aid who doubted its efficacy. 10 More recently,
critiques have suggested donors were culpable thanks to their support for
bad economic policies in earlier years, e.g. helping parastatal development in
the 1960s and 1970s, coupled with insufficient attention to the impact of aid
on recipient institutions in subsequent years (van de Walle 1998). Other
damning attacks on donors arise from dependency theorists. They claim that
aid is really provided in order to exploit recipient countries, with the effect of
slowing development (Amin 1973 and Seligson and Passe-Smith 1998). This
charge still resonates among some donor NGOs and recipient country officials.
Finally, after 50 years of experience, there is a massive accumulation of
critical evaluations of aid, especially failed projects in Africa. These critiques
informed much of the analytical work reviewed in this volume's earlier
chapters, including the influential work of the World Bank by Burnside and
Dollar (1997) discussed in Chapter 4 . In general, flaws in donor motivation,
bureaucratic mismanagement and recipient country socio-political distortion
of aid objectives were identified . The reaction to perceived aid failure has
been to identify better ways to use aid more effectively. As Eric Thorbecke
illustrates in Chapter 1, each successive decade has brought efforts to correct
and improve aid.
Domestic publics and elites have absorbed some of the scepticism raised
by critics (Noel and Therien 1995: 547-48). In Japan, for example, less
than half the population in 1996 thought foreign aid benefited 'developing
countries' while 15 per cent held it was of no benefit.11 Fact finding
missions by parliamentary bodies have raised concerns about ineffective
results and misused resources. In the United States, after years of public
discussion of such results, it is not surprising that in 1998 about half the
population favoured giving no aid. While only 10 per cent of those
considered 'leaders' held this sceptical view, leaders support for aid levels
declined (Reilly 1999: 38). The decline in trust of government in many
OECD countries might provide a more general reason for some of these
views. In fact, for the us population, aid has never been viewed favourably.
The portion of the public supporting it in principle ranged from 52 per
cent in 197 4 to 46 per cent in 1998 (Reilly 1999: 21). Disappointment with
aid probably accounts for the downward shift in support for aid among
leaders more so than other factors.
Smaller special interest payoffs
A fifth reason for a decline in aid support is that special economic interests
in donors are less powerful. It can be argued, indeed is argued, that aid has
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the most support from groups inside donor countries that derive selective
advantage from it. These include firms with investments in recipient coun
tries, or who provide exports tied to aid, and bureaucracies with employees
with career interests in aid - including NGOs. There has been an impressive
growth in NGOs in the 1980s and 1990s, and they have developed strong
ties to aid programmes that help fund them. 12 Their growing strength
creates a powerful lobby for continued government allocations (but, as the
sixth reason suggests, their success reinforces a presumption that develop
ment can be addressed as a private sector responsibility). Business firms
with profits linked to guarantees or direct payment from an aid account
also actively support aid levels in their home country. The growth of direct
foreign investment, the development of alternatives to aid for increasing
export sales and trans-corporate co-operation have reduced the salience of
aid for most firms operating overseas or who are heavily export dependent.
Moreover, there is a vicious cycle at work. Once the aid pie begins to
shrink, the fewer domestic economic interests it will serve. In addition,
there can be a decline in the lobbying weight of groups that historically
supported aid, as their interest or their ability to shape aid declines.
Another reason why aid has weaker special interest constituencies is
because the countries receiving aid have changed. As aid has shifted from
Asia to Africa, and from fast- to slow-growing countries, the results sought
in these recipients promise fewer political and economic benefits for export
or financial interests within donors. Aid has less relevance as a way to open
recipients' markets if those markets have very small potential. Exporters
look to market benefits in large countries such as China or Nigeria, none of
which receives significant per capita aid. 13 The decline of aid compared to
direct foreign investment also reduced commercial interests' support. The
IMF is more effective than aid institutions in promoting their interests. A
kind of downward cycle of support results. All these factors have made aid
less relevant to donor country firms and bureaucracies.
Ascendent neo-liberal outlook

A sixth, and final, reason for lower aid volumes is the shift to neo-liberal
views. In the global climate of opinion, the size and intervention of govern
ment has come to be considered excessive. Such views are dominant in
western welfare states as well as socialist ones. The United States and Great
Britain championed reduction of entitlement spending. This view, first
fashionable in the 1980s, became triumphant by the 1990s, as the Soviet
Union and China began to adopt market-oriented economic policies. 14 As
governments are less trusted and market solutions are celebrated, the use
of governments to transfer resources globally has become decreasingly
legitimate. Yet some motor for efficient progress is needed. This is
increasingly met by the rise in private capital flows and foreign investment,
especially by multinational corporations. Such flows have grown remarkably
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compared with portfolio investment, short-term loans, or aid flows (see
Chapter 3 and Stopford 1998). Most of these funds, however, do not reach
very poor countries, such as those in Africa, with the greatest gaps between
needed and realised public investment. Yet these private flows do reduce
support for the public system of aid that had supported international
financial flows, especially World Bank lending. With large capital flows
occurring outside the Bretton Woods institutions, and with the concessional
lending of the World Bank largely targeted to very poor states, such as
those in Africa, aspirations about aid launching rapid growth, as it seemed
to do for South Korea, Indonesia and Taiwan, have waned. Confidence in
aid as an instrument has eroded. Its past association as a successful boost in
the early years of Asian state-led development was undercut by the 1997-8
Asian crisis. The neo-liberal creed in extreme form has no place for foreign
aid as a public good; aid as charity should be voluntary, not tax based. The
NGOs, successfully mobilising private funds, confirm this ideal.
The effect of this shift in ideas is manifest in the programme of various
political movements to cut 'welfare' both domestically and internationally.
It can also be seen in concern about the unsustainability of national entitle
ment policies. Deep scepticism about state solutions pervades analyses by
individual states and multilateral agencies, such as the OECD and the World
Bank. The solution to past aid failures is more market-oriented solutions.
Ironically, privatisation as a solution does not exclude public funds to assist
this process, even though logically this requires state management of the
process (see Chapter 12 and Kahler 1990). Thus a broad shift in world
views about aid emerges from the ascendance of a neo-liberal orientation.
In donor countries, a decline in national welfare has been matched by a
decline in foreign aid (Noel and Therien 1995). Such judgments have been
reinforced by the analysis of aid failures.

Four donor motivations
What support for aid is likely to exist among donors for such future
directions? Coalitions of internationally oriented populace, mobilised by
political parties and the advocacy of NGOs, will be particularly necessary to
sustain aid, especially as development imperatives supplant earlier political
ones. However, aid targeted on development goals must also relate to the
self-interested motivations of donors. We know that the goals of donors in
the contemporary state system have complex economic underpinnings.
The political context faced by donors has great uncertainty about security
and economic 'interests', as conventionally defined. Foreign policy goals
centre on combating immediate disturbances, such as conflicts, emergencies
and global environmental threats. The difficulty in pursuing these goals
suggests that a collective action problem is the basic barrier to sustainable
aid. Benefits of aid are so dispersed that donor political interests are hard
to marshal. Costs, such as taxes, are visible and divisible in comparison.
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How to overcome the collective action problem is complicated, to say the
least; paths to doing so will vary according to the political system of various
donors and the assets available to mobilise populations within their existing
national creeds.
Donors have four motivations for sustaining aid. These provide
opportunities in various donors for mobilising support, domestically and
transnationally. They also represent desiderata shaping aid size, packaging
and effectiveness. These are: (i) the pursuit of global public goods, (ii)
economic development benefits for donors, (iii) domestic special interests
and (iv) increased willingness of recipients to accept conditionality. The
first will draw on collective benefits from reduced violence, disease and
pollution. The second will build on national self-interest in gains from
trade and investment thanks to economic development. The third rests on
interest group pressures and bureaucracies that organise and serve these.
The last rests on what recipient countries are willing to do to get aid; they
are likely to pay higher prices in terms of loss of implementing condi
tionality.
Global public goods
In the 1990s, threats to political and economic values emerged from the
rise in wars and conflicts (Chapter 1 7), the financial instability in global
markets seen in the Asian crises (Chapter 14) and the increase in pollutants
and diseases which flow across borders (Chapter 11). Donor countries have
an interest in reducing these threats. A more benign and secure global
environment is a key donor goal to which aid can be attached. This goal is
now widely cited by donors, both in general and in announcing specific
commitments. The World Bank and many bilateral donors have a growing
portfolio of projects to improve the environment, to secure better gover
nance and to support strengthening financial sector regulatory capacity. An
intellectual foundation for these initiatives rests on a recognition of the
importance of public sector institutions in providing frameworks. The
domination of neo-liberal ideas, eschewing public sector intervention, is
hence challenged by these global concerns (Gray 1998). The pendulum
swinging toward neo-liberal philosophy has probably reached its apogee.
Hence, the scepticism about aid it encouraged, seeing aid as an inappro
priate welfare transfer, is offset by concern about international market
failures, including states in collapse. Global public goods encourage aid as
a way to build constraints against market excesses.
A wide variety of practices threaten global welfare. Dumping wastes in
the ocean, cutting tropical forests, releasing carbon emissions into the
atmosphere are all understood to create shared environmental losses to
people around the world. The spread of infectious disease and other public
health hazards also are preventable losses. Industrialisation and population
pressures exacerbate these global 'bads', while the absence of regulatory
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mechanisms permits them. Some international paths to collective action
have been designed, both through. international treaties and via trans
national politics, the latter via international NG0s that support environ
mental lobbying by local affiliates. Donor publics seeking these collective
goods recognise aid as a tool. Its role includes reducing transaction costs of
negotiations and inducing co-operation instead of free riding by having
rich countries bear some of the costs of jointly beneficial actions by
developing countries.
Analy tically, there is an appealing case for increasing the supply of
global public goods, from research to the environmental regulation, from
financial arrangements to conflict reduction. A recent World Bank World
Development Report (World Bank 1997a) stressed the role of the state for
welfare improving action. With the rise in refugees and hot money, interest
in dampening destabilising flows of people and money is high. Donor
government budgets have grown by billions of dollars to control the
substantial rise in the last decade of flows of people and illegal substances
that have fostered efforts to strengthen border controls, at least in Europe
and the United States. Among political elites in donor states enhanced aid
may also be attractive as a way to use international agreements to leverage
desired national policies, for example, on trade or regulation of illegal
economic activity.
With the waning of the cold war, defects in state institutions and their
performance on issues of protecting natural resources and the environment
have gained general visibility and mass appeal. Calls for intervention to
offset bad effects in developing countries are striking. In addition, health
threats, gender equity, pollution, hunger and poverty related suffering has
built broad coalitions in donor states, spurred on by NGO actions, inter
national conferences and trans-governmental co-operation. 15
Economic development
A second goal motivating donors is the benefits they derive from economic
development in recipient states. T he earlier chapters in this volume make a
strong case that aid has been, or at least can be, effective in promoting
development. For the donor state as a whole, looking at its reasons to
commit both bilateral and multilateral funds, there is near universal
recognition that development will be linked to trade enhancement and
expanded, more secure overseas investment opportunities. To care about
such benefits, confidence in the efficacy of aid and development is needed.
One explanation for earlier failures in development has been that foreign
governments were, at least as perceived by public opinion in donor
countries, resisting aid objectives. Tying success to adaptive and monitored
project objectives and relating these to the prospect of accelerating
development, are measures by which the decline in aid can be limited.
Support for aid is also greater if the recipients are viewed as worthy. Success
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in achieving development in aid concentrated on 'worthy' states can reverse
cynicism that has grown around the process (Kapur 1998 and Grant and
Nijman 1998). Amending aid practices to realise greater effectiveness
involves greater country targeting, capacity building and improvement of
bureaucratic management, as was earlier proposed as a supportable target
when linked to economic performance (Chapters 1, 5-9 and Lancaster
1999).
The exact importance of economic development, to donors at least, is
difficult to measure through gains from trade from poor country recipients. 16
Among OECD states, the share of trade with such aid target states is small
and not growing. The financial exposure of debt in these states is likewise
small, even though these are countries with the highest debt burden
relative to their economies. Economic development goals for aid may be
inversely proportional to the size of a recipient. Were per capita aid to
become significantly larger in countries with large populations - China or
India, for example - the consequences for donor economies from aid
accelerated growth would weigh far heavier. Aid could also be linked to
smoothing global firm alliances. Political resistance in these countries
makes this unlikely; hence the weight of development benefits are likely to
come from accelerated growth in smaller countries. Moreover, the
participation of these states in global economic affairs has diffuse value. In
recent years, donors encouraged adoption of economic rules that are
conducive to global capitalist growth and to increased trade, by these states.
Membership of wro virtually doubled (Chapter 16). Countries such as
France and the Nordic states abandoned support for state centred develop
ment models. This convergence of policy thinking on economic issues
lowers global transaction costs. Aid reinforces this great transformation.
Economic growth also improves realisation of donor goals for political
performance (Przeworski and Limongi 1997).
In sum, the shift of aid toward the most difficult development cases
reduces direct benefits to the donor economies, but increases gains from a
reduction of global burdens and threats which can be avoided by growth.
Narrow donor interests distorting aid flows are sometimes blamed for poor
performance. Past failures of aid have been explained by the allocation and
absorption of aid according to non-economic factors that undermine its
desired effectiveness on development. The appeal of developmentally
focused aid in coming years is that it could escape this distortion, accepting
that aid to weak states must be multi-dimensional to be effective.
Domestic coalitions

We have noted how unbundling the nation-state as a unit allows us to see
how special interests within countries form coalitions to support various aid
policies. These interests are substantial; the problem is putting together
coalitions supporting diffuse goals. Virtually all donors link aid to domestic
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exports: either for commodities or services such as technical assistance.
Inside donor countries, firms then compete to protect their share of benefits
from a dwindling aid appropriation. Firms and sectors that see foreign aid
expanding their incomes, lobby for aid appropriations. This varies depend
ing on the influence such groups command and the salience of aid for their
profitability. Organised labour, for example, long a supporter of aid in OECD
domestic politics, has gradually withdrawn support, especially as trade with
developing countries is perceived as bringing pressure to keep wages low.
Sectoral influence on aid policy is nicely illustrated by food aid. This aid
flow (discussed in Chapter 8) has long enjoyed strong farm sector support,
most visibly in the United States. As the power of the farm lobby's voting
bloc has declined (as there are fewer farm voters and legislators), and as
their interest in subsidising exports moved toward the solution of trade
negotiations to gain more market access abroad, farm sector support of aid
weakened. In the case of food aid, humanitarian groups have become more
important. While farm interests still join forces in support of appropri
ations for this tied form of aid, their importance has waned. Getting rid of
us and EU surpluses unduly drove the size and allocation of food aid and
distorted aid effectiveness. This is one reason Colding and Pinstrup
Andersen (Chapter 8) propose giving the World Food Programme (WFP) a
larger role in food aid management, because as a UN body it is less subject
to disposal pressures. The risk in cutting ties with special interests, however,
is that as selective benefits are lost, groups inside donors will lose interest in
aid. This has occurred, as we noted, with regard to food aid; it is also the
case with respect to financial sector support for aid (Haggard et al. 1993).
Domestic coalitions then explain differential support for types of aid;
and they partially account for the variety of support aid enjoys among
donors. Generally, the larger the aid package, the more benefits can accrue
to specific firms or sectors in a donor country, and the more intensely these
groups will build winning coalitions in budgetary struggles over scarce
resources. Often support coalitions form around particular components of
aid that directly affect them. Universities lobby for the research and insti
tutional strengthening lines in aid budgets. Contracting firms bid for
airports and phone systems. Once shares of aid budgets are settled, how
ever, these various special interests support the overall appropriation. 17
Non-governmental organisations, such as church organisations and
political parties, are the most frequently used vehicles for articulating equity
demands. Such groups have been strong advocates in donor countries for
generous foreign aid. Thus, interest group politics is not exclusively
grounded in selective economic gains. Every donor's culture is saturated
with various demands for justice, duties to others, requirements for national
rectitude. Foreign aid from OECD states is justified by various formulas by
which national responsibilities are met by providing aid. Among these are
concerns for international welfare (or distributive justice) and for burden
sharing among donors. In socialist welfare states, aid objectives continue to
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be especially visible in support of aid for reasons of national philosophy
(Noel and Therien 1995).
One player among such coalitions is the aid bureaucracy itself. Bureau
cratic interests exist for all established agencies, which quite naturally seek
to maintain themselves. 18 Managing aid is a profession, and it attracts
people committed to its goals. Not surprisingly they lobby to protect or
increase their resources. Like physicians, they have a body of received
wisdom about how to achieve the goals of aid, usually development.
Multilateral institutions do this quite openly, with national citizens testify
ing to parliaments on behalf of appropriations. They promote allocations
to their work by speeches, reports, and mobilisation of support from allies
in other parts of government and the private sector. These bureaucracies
have a limited ability to shape appropriations. This is true for both
domestic based government bureaus and multilateral agencies. Indeed,
many government branches - foreign affairs, trade, commerce and intel
ligence ministries, for example - weigh in to support aid. For them it is a
complementary resource for carrying out their tasks. Multilateral agencies,
such as the World Bank and UNDP have officials who pursue aid promotion
interests. They have lobbied through legislative testimony and personal
networks in their home countries.
Increased concessions from recipients

A final motivation for donors is increased influence for each aid dollar.
Historically, some recipient countries have shopped wantonly for aid, while
others accepted aid only if it fitted with their own plans and preferences.
Over time, however, except for the rapidly growing countries of Asia,
recipients have moved toward offering more concessions to donor pre
ferences. Attitudes are far more accommodating compared to 20 years ago.
One reason for this is the loss of an option to switch among donors; with
the end of aid from the Communist bloc this has largely disappeared. 19
The ease with which Indonesia, Egypt and India resisted aid and policy
pressures from the West in the 1960s is over. Especially in Africa, recipient
countries have become supplicants, trotting out a range of projects in hope
to capture aid (Lancaster 1999).
As a result, donors can now bargain for more. Even elements crucial to
power maintenance, such as corruption, may be open to concessions.
Gaining support for international positions is less salient to donors
compared to aid regimes of earlier years. They can now ask a higher policy
and institutional price for their money. What donors can now demand in
such circumstances, in return for aid, is for these standard ways of
corruption to end. This is no easy request. Corruption, associated with
over-billing and capital flight, can become institutionalised in the aid
receiving country to the point that it would be hard to avoid a diversion of
aid. However, corrupt predatory states now have difficulty raising revenues
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to pay the costs of government. Hence, government requires financing
from foreign aid. In spite of donor policies eschewing the financing of
'recurrent' costs, this avenue opens a powerful path to address the state
strengthening target. Given the importance of state institutions for develop
ment, as suggested, donor agencies may attempt to ensure future sustain
ability by demanding political reform of institutions (North 1998).
Of course, changes in recipient attitudes are not simply bought by aid.
When first China and, by the 1990s, Russia became recipients, their orient
ations. toward aid and development strategies had first shifted, thanks to
internally driven forces. Official policy favoured market-oriented economic
policy; aid was to support political liberalisation as defined by the recipient.
Another event raising the malleability of recipients has been a rise in
natural and man-made emergencies. These created growing demands for
emergency aid. A third factor encouraging recipients to accept greater
conditions was the end of options in finding alternative sources of aid.
When famine came to North Korea in 1995 it led to large flows of aid from
Western governments, mostly through the UN. Resistance to external
influence abated, at least partially.
In review, the last reason for sustaining or increasing donor motivation
for aid is that recipients will concede more in return. Broad concessions are
possible, including an assault on society-wide corruption, an end to human
and property rights violations, and the use of regulatory capacity to expose
illegal public and private actions, such as tax evasion. The failures reported
by Elliot Berg in Chapter 12 occurring in the privatisation process illustrate
the importance of such changes. Another area in which recipients might
offer higher concessions is in the regulation of finance and the environ
ment. Weak state authority has failed to cope with the rapid changes;
opportunities for predation in the globalised economy's financial and raw
materials markets grow (Ascher and Healy 1990). Indifference by the aid
regime to these problems, will leave the lessons of past aid unused. The
result will be a further decline in moral anchors and, in the absence of
norms for living in a highly monetised society, anomie and a climate for
corruption and social conflict will prevail.

Strategies for aid sustainability
The shift in the organising rationale for aid - from cold war rivalry, North
South paternalism and state-led development to globalisation and market
oriented growth - has contributed, along with tumbling aid levels, to a
weakening of global authority (Hopkins 1995). This also unleashed new
economic interests and cross-national alignments that affected bargaining
within the aid regime. The underpinnings of aid, institutionalised in the
post-WWII era, will not continue on inertia alone. Future aid will necessarily
be linked to these changes. Or it will disappear. In response to this challenge,
new and more complex formulas for aid have been put forward (Chapters I
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and 16-18 and World Bank 1997a, 1998b). They stress using aid effectively
to build governance while expanding market activity.
What prospects are there for this emerging future aid regime? Three
targets for aid have wide appeal among diverse elements in the donor and
recipient communities. These are (i) state strengthening, (ii) improved
market management and (iii) emergency safety nets. These targets are
recommended as problems for promoting future aid. Moreover, motiv
ations of donors are favourably predisposed to these targets, since they
appeal to overlapping transnational coalitions and can be linked with
benefits, as argued earlier.
Previous chapters provide background for this claim. Several of this
volume's authors - e.g. Irma Adelman in Chapter 2 and Tony Addison in
Chapter 17 - see the deterioration of states as a major obstacle to
development. While aid effectiveness can be undermined by a poor set of
policies, the right policy environment is a chimera without a functioning
state. After all, a state's key role is to set up conditions for markets to
operate. In particular, developing country markets are recognised as
imperfect (Chapters 12 and 14). So reforming markets is a second target.
Finally, with widespread poverty and growing instability, refugees and
internally displaced peoples have grown. Aid linked to emergency needs
commands priority. This target represents a politically sustainable path for
reinforcing international safety nets. It is an insurance mechanism to
protect vital human and phy sical capital. The increased share of aid going
to emergencies is likely to continue, since the conditions creating these
emergencies continue with the growth of failed states and the large impact
of natural disasters on crowded, ecologically vulnerable populations. Below,
these three aid targets are considered in more detail.

Strengthening states
Political goals are important. There has been a continuous growth in the
number of wars, especially civil wars, since 1950. The rise of internal wars
has spilled across borders, involving neighbouring states and even out-of
region participants. The Balkans and the Great Lakes region of Africa are
the most striking instances. The involvement of the UN in Somalia,
Cambodia and Southern Africa, and of NATO in the Balkan wars, suggests
that containing armed conflict is a rising goal of Western states, especially
when refugees threaten to destabilise surrounding states. This goal is only
weakly undertaken in Africa, however, as Congo (Kinshasa) has become the
locus for nine countries and a dozen transnational insurgent groups to
engage in fighting. 20
From about 10 wars ongoing during 1945-55, there were perhaps 50 wars
being waged in the 1990s, most of them internal wars, and with enormous
total death rates. This growth, encompassing conflicts from Sri Lanka and
Afghanistan to Liberia and Colombia, is due to complex factors, including
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the proionged duration of fighting, which became chronic in many areas.
The prospect is that peace will be short-lived in areas afflicted with these
semi-legitimate, semi-sovereign states. This creates a case for targeting aid
to the task of nurturing peaceful conditions in such anarchic conditions, as
was made by Tony Addison (Chapter 17). He sees a continuing role in areas
where 'incomplete peace' lurks. The first concern is to improve the
operation of polities so that ethnic rivalry, or the quick wealth from cap
turing resource rents, does not spawn conflict. Domestic conflicts endanger
food supplies, basic institutions, and are a barrier to any long-term
development (de Soysa and Gleditsch 1999). A second goal of targeting
state failures is to discourage internal wars from generating refugees,
promoting terrorist movements and increasing threats to stability, all of
which can spread elsewhere. Exigencies of change, including ethnic
conflict, nationalism, and globalisation, have caused the rise in conflict.
The Rwanda case highlights failures of past aid to create conditions for
peace. Peter Uvin argues that when civil war flared in 1991-2, structural
adjustment-based aid utterly failed to address growing political rifts.
Projects focused on food production, family planning, education and
health, were judged against narrow technical benchmarks. Five billion
dollars of foreign aid, delivered over 15 y ears, condoned official racism,
ethnic identity cards, corruption, violence, hatred and human right abuses
(Uvin 1998). Responsible government criteria as aid requirements, if
credible and even modestly effective, would have averted this calamity.
Strengthening state institutions is also a prerequisite for securing
increasingly important global collective goods. Within the current world
system, stability, predictability and recognition of rights are necessary
properties of a state if environmental damage and international crime is to
be confronted (Mittelman and Johnston 1999). The absence of terrorist
threats, for example, can be linked to expected state compliance with rules
that discourage and penalise terrorism. On the positive side, the aim is to
make it possible for developing countries to deliver global goods on
environment, human rights, migration control and health. Weak conflict
ridden states are the worst resource exploiters and make the largest mess
for others. Efforts to strengthen such countries are supported by neigh
bouring states, by donor states' foreign affairs ministries, military institu
tions and attentive publics and by environmental and humanitarian NG0s.
State strengthening efforts relate to governance/democracy projects, tech
nical assistance for capacity building and basic budget support.
Managing such aid successfully, however, is difficult (Lancaster 1999).
Agreement on broad goals is not easily transferred into effective aid
projects in this area of capacity building and state formation. The major
question facing such aid use is not 'what' but 'how'. For example, if
ensuring rule-of-law rights are core elements in a successful state, then how
is this achieved? Will assistance to judiciary organisations or police work?
Strengthening government institutions with technical support and by
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privatisation, for example, are widely endorsed as ways to improve public
sector performance. Yet Elliott Berg's review of public enterprise reform
(Chapter 12) and Channing Arndt's discussion of technical assistance
(Chapter 6) suggest a paucity of success in strengthening efforts. Lessons
for effective aid reviewed earlier suggest that direct aid to officials and
institutions may not work. If so, indirect aid to incumbent officials which
strengthen them politically may be the best strategy (Kapur 1998 and
Lancaster 1999). This strategy aims to improve intangible goods, such as
legitimacy. Conceivably, infrastructure projects can achieve this, while
constraining corrupt officials through using the aid to exact conditions
making it harder for them to hide their money. Bank transparency around
the world could also work to stop international opportunities for money
laundering and tax evasion which plague states with bankrupt treasuries.
So external pressures are needed, in order to prevent domestic rent
seeking or other self-serving tendencies by public or private agencies and
these can be achieved through tough bureaucratic norms within OECD
countries as well as using aid to provide external sanctions.
Similarly, the importance of the rule-of-law within countries is a logical
part of this target, but we need research help. The design of contextually
sensitive and effective projects, including how they should relate to govern
ment, is a challenge. Deepening authoritative expectations is a complex
task and may require long-term adaptive aid financing. Too little is said
regarding its importance in the international context and in creating
conditions for effective state regulation, to achieve, among other goals, the
creation of private market guarantees and sensible privatisation of state
enterprises (Chapters 12 and 13). Stable expectations, based on a reliable
civil service, are as crucial as a country's laws, if the aim of aid is to promote
economic stability.
Market management
The second promising direction for future aid is to target market construc
tion and financial management. This is the next stage of structural
adjustment. The barriers to privatisation and good policies identified in
various earlier chapters need to be tackled. The chapter by Irma Adelman,
for example, affirms that the desiderata of efficient markets - information,
free participation, multiple actors - do not occur readily. State oversight,
regulatory mechanisms and provision of corrective ingredients, such as
information, are important elements in constructing markets. Markets are
not self-provisioning. They require external resources and constraints. The
imperfections in markets, dramatised for Asian countries in financial crises
of 1997-9, are striking. Aid can be targeted to address these imperfections,
certainly in those countries with multiple banking problems, and with
heavy debt. Financial markets are of special concern for securing improved
frameworks, both to control panic instability and to resolve excessive
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indebtedness. The pattern of debt crises and economic downturn in the
1990s moved from Mexico to affect a wide array of countries from
Indonesia to Russia. And the deep indebtedness of Africa festers, as the
failure of debt forgiveness programmes for the most heavily indebted poor
states has failed.21 The most poignant cases exist in Africa. The World
Bank, the IMF and the UN agencies have all stressed the need for national
governments to take the lead and initiate economic management that
addresses their imbalances of globalisation. The basic taxation capacity of
many countries is so crippled that they skew their economies toward taxing
too heavily the most productive sectors, such as exports, as they are the
easiest to reach. This distorts markets, and is unnecessary. Policies can be
adopted that involve little bureaucratic cost and more decentralised
arrangements (Chapters 12-15). The revenue base for governments could
be improved if national level corruption, both official and private, could be
lowered.22

Poverty and emergency safety nets
The third target for aid is poverty and emergency safety nets. This theme
coincides with commitments to poverty reduction at the OECD and the
World Bank. Poverty is connected emotionally to emergency relief. Inter
national relief assistance plays the role of a safety net for the poorest
countries and peoples. The rise in emergency aid coincides with the
return to a poverty focus, which had been the central goal of aid in the
1970s prior to policy reform or the structural adjustment ascendance.
The treatment of emergency aid as a special, unfortunate use of funds
would be replaced by eliminating the emergency to development
continuum in aid design. The targets are those poor vulnerable people
whose climb from poverty can be set back decades - by emergencies .
Rescuing them with international assistance, when recipient countries
lack the resources to do this, can be linked to long-term strategies both
analytically and institutionally. For example, in Bangladesh in 1998, the
worst flood in the twentieth century threatened the well-being of 30
million poor and caused $1.5 billion worth of damage. Aid provided by
dozens of international agencies protected these endangered people from
ruinous effects. The aid was channelled through (and strengthened
poverty-oriented) local institutions, both state agencies and non
governmental ones, such as the Grameen Bank. It supported local safety
nets and averted the worst consequences of the flood for Bangladesh's
most impoverished populations (Kahn 1999). Early warning systems for
emergencies also offer a link between information about the conditions of
the poor, their needs, and their abilities to adapt to new opportunities
following a shock to their lives, a consideration that may offset the rapid
expansion of information that otherwise increases rich and poor divides
(World Bank 1998b: ch. 8).
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Summing up
The three targets discussed above: (i) state strengthening, (ii) market
management and (iii) poverty and emergency safety net guarantees all
relate to diffuse goals: global goods and economic justice. There is no
simple design for aid-use in pursuing these targets, as earlier chapters made
clear. Aid channels and modalities to impact these are necessarily context
dependent, including emergency aid to protect human capital. What does
appear true is that such aid may be more intrusive of sovereignty than
previous aid.
Strengthening states appeals broadly to popular concern about threats
from the international sphere. Reilly (1999) found that international
terrorism, for example, seen as out of control in weak states, was the most
frequently cited threat to the United States according to the American
public. Support for using aid to improve markets can be found among the
development banks, private international financial and corporate institu
tions, and their government allies in ministries of finance, trade, commerce
and legislative bodies. Support for the twin aid goals - sustainable reduc
tion of poverty and emergency responses - involves helping the most
vulnerable and comes from the same coalitions generally. It is the poorest,
after all, who are most endangered by disasters (natural or man-made).
Support for long-term poverty reduction through institutions such as the
Grameen Bank is popular with the same groups: NGOs, political parties and
foundations concerned about global inequities. These coalitions support
emergency humanitarian relief and are frequently the most effective
advocates of poverty-oriented aid. Even though emergency aid is criticised
as a 'Band-Aid', unsustainable, and even counter to long-term goals, it is
supported by the same humanitarian sentiments that put poverty at the top
of the aid policy agenda.

Conclusions: future conditions
Development - economic, social, and sustainable - without an effective
state is impossible.
(World Bank 1997a: 18)
A major condition for sustainability of future aid is a belief in its efficacy.
Such a belief rests on seeing improvements linked to aid. And this, in turn,
is affected by what donors and recipients want improved. Complex social
processes shape aid use, including the administrative management of donors
and the policies and state machinery of recipients. As noted throughout
this volume, state institutions make a big difference in development.
Adelman emphasised that 'a government with substantial autonomy, capacity
and credibility is required for successful long-term economic growth.'
(Chapter 2). North (1990) shares this view, asserting that institution of
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formal rules, informal norms and enforcement probabilities determine
economic growth. He finds a pressing need to understand how third world
and East European polities operate in order to promote development
through informal constraints. The focus on institutions in this volume
pushes future aid toward attention to informal rules that affect states,
markets and vulnerabilities of the poor.
Many aid receiving candidates are anarchical states. In Africa and the
post-communist world, terms such as patrimonial, shadow, rent-seeking,
semi-sovereign, mafia-like and corrupt have been used to characterise the
polity. These two areas have been the major foci for aid in the 1990s. Most
of the 50-odd wars of this decade are internal and occur in these two areas.
Thus the basic capacity of states to deliver security is problematic. As noted
in Chapter 17, aid can play a vital role in rescuing peoples from the damage
of conflict. It also can assist state formation, helping build administrative
structure and analytical or steering capacity. The vital role these play in
development processes has been stressed in earlier chapters (e.g. Chapter
2). Aid to these countries, aimed at state reform, may require unconven
tional development assistance packages. State strengthening would focus
on core functions: legitimate force to uphold order, tax collection to
finance public goods, technical assistance to enhance military and tax
collection skills and controls to limit corruption, encourage civic norms and
expand accountability. These and other governance elements need deepen
ing. Withholding aid has been the major tool for political conditionality.
This does not work very well because of pressures to release funds already
earmarked. Given this problem, and the desire to aid weak states, one goal
of aid must be to acknowledge ends that maximise its relation to political
performance and minimise the ability of predatory officials to hijack it for
private purposes.
For both rich and poor countries, state failure promises to be the
greatest threat in coming decades. Openness and sound economic policies
are largely irrelevant in situations where capital flight dominates private
market financial calculations. For states to 'own' a set of policies, including
use of aid, there must first be a state structure. Aid to provide a transition
from anarchy must precede aid for a transition to a stable development
path. From the states of the former Soviet Union to the collapsed
governments in Africa, there is a growing vacuum of political order - a
vacuum that aid undertakings are challenged to fill. Aid for political
construction requires delicate balancing in which the trade-off between
conditionality and ownership is acknowledged. This dilemma is still to be
resolved. Yet it must be, so that countries with the greatest needs, often
ones most troubled by political upheavals, will not continue to be the ones
least able to absorb aid efficiently. Resolutions of the dilemma relate to the
three targets for aid discussed earlier. To the extent these targets grow
among donor motivations, they will point directly to behavioural obstacles
for aid effectiveness, such as corrupt or merely under-skilled human
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capital. This theme is easier to observe than address. A major future task
for research on aid effectiveness is to explain how recipient governments
can realise stronger capacity as well as some authentic 'ownership' of their
work as a result of aid. Reducing failures of political institutions in recipients
requires prescriptions with greater specificity. We need to know how aid can
effect real improvements in politics.
This chapter has looked at changing donor motivations and asked what
can and should shape future aid. With decay in recipient country
institutions a problem, with a rise in support for global goods, such as
environmental protection, and with donors enjoying increased scope to
demand concessions from aid recipients, targeting aid to save failing
political institutions commands and deserves broad support.
Notes
* The author is most grateful for research assistance and advice by Sandip
Sukhtankar of Swarthmore College, and to the wisdom provided by two
extremely helpful commentaries, Professors Finn Tarp and Steven O'Connell.
Most political economy interest addressed in this book focused on how recipient
government behaviour affected aid's impact (see Chapters 2 and 18).The most
persistent theme by the World Bank and scholars in the 1990s has been how
'good policies' in recipients were crucial to aid effectiveness.Ravi Kanbur notes
that in donor-recipient relationships the 'donor is the leader, and decides on
the level of aid.The recipient is the follower who, taking as the given the level
of aid, decides on actions....The level of aid is thus chosen to maximise the
donor 's preferences, subject to the reaction function of the recipient ....'
(Chapter 18).
2 The major debate addressed in Chapter 4 about aid effectiveness is relevant
here.Hansen and Tarp's view that aid works even in an unfavourable policy
environment implies that targeting vulnerable peoples even in weak states
remains a meaningful donor strategy when poverty alleviation is the overriding
goal of aid policy.
3 Lumsdaine (1993) suggests altruism has become ascendant, but various studies
suggest this has been, at best, a secondary motive (Chapter 3, Alesina and
Dollar I 998, McGillivray and White 1993a, Noel and Therien 1995, White 1974
and Wall 1973).
4 Even excluding Marshall Plan funds, us aid in the 1990s was many times higher.
5 NATO members, such as Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands, along with
Sweden maintained high levels of aid relative to their GNP, having adopted the
UN target for development in national legislation.These four countries are thus
denoted UN-target donors in Figure 19.2.
6 ln 199 2-6 Russia and China received $9 and $16 billion of aid, respectively,
amounting to about l O per cent of all aid during this period (not even counting
the growing aid to East Europe and former states of the Soviet Union).
7 Once aid became institutionalised as a practice in international affairs, the
regime developed an inertial force of its own.Multiple purposes sustained it (see
Chapters 1-4, Lancaster 1999 and Schraeder et al. 1998).In classic fashion, by
creating international institutions and organisations for aid, the practice of aid
has been continued even as older motives for it have weakened (Keohane 1998).
The effort of DAC to develop a new rationale for donors, focusing on poverty
reduction and co-operation in aid implementation, is such an institutional
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adaptation. The bureaucratic reorganisation of bilateral aid agencies, the World
Bank and UN development organisations, including their wide adoption of
impact criteria to assess aid, are further evidence of adaptive institutional
change (see Chapter 18 for further discussion).
The concern with disappointment is widely discussed (e.g. Cassen et al. 1994,
van de Walle 1998, Lancaster 1999 and Chapters 1-4).
Political motivations distorting aid effectiveness is a frequent conclusion in
economic analyses of aid donor motivations, as noted in Chapter 4 and by
Alesina and Dollar (1998).
See Bauer (1973) or Boone (1994, 1996).
Information obtained from the Web site of JICA Oapan International Co
operation Agency), retrieved in I 999 from the World Wide Web: http://www.
jica.gojp.
From an effectiveness perspective, these organisations offer a myriad of advant
ages and problems in their role in the aid process (e.g. Weiss and Gordenker
1996 and Hulme and Edwards 1997).
Aid is targeted to countries largely outside the group of states with rising
salience for international politics (see Stremlau 1994 and Chase et al. 1998).
Fukayama (1992) notes the triumph of liberalism. The widespread and pervasive
influence of anti-state and market promoting ideology is explicated in Gray
(1998) and Grant and Nijman (1998).
Princen and Finger (1994) detail the efforts of this environmental coalition. The
advocacy group Bread for the World cites a network of 41 international NGOs
that have become powerful advocates on these issues (BFWI 1999).
Economic models can capture some aspects of gain, including links of aid to
trade patterns (Schraeder et al. 1998), but indirect gains from positive extern
alities of growth, such as unwanted economic migration or cross-border crime,
are elusive to estimation.
Aid then can be an important resource for particular donor country actors, both
private businesses and non-profit humanitarian organisations. These private
sector international actors lobby both home and 'partner' country governments
to win contracts for providing 'public' goods, e.g. telecommunications or
consulting services. In emergencies, for example, there is a group of firms that
specialise in the rapid delivery of supplies such as vehicles and camp provisions.
Foreign aid is visible pursuit for agencies with fairly hard target allocations at
stake. Ravi Kanbur notes the power of such contractor groups in lobbying the
World Bank and bilateral donors for releasing committed funds in spite of
Ghana's failure to meet agreed conditions for aid (Chapter 18). Aid has sub
sidised the contracts of national firms doing business with foreign governments
and it has rewarded foreign governments for favourable treatment of national
firms. Inside donor countries, similar benefits occur. In Canada, for instance,
the CIDA is quite explicit about its aid supporting 36,000 employees and notes
that 70 per cent of aid is spent in Canada. Universities and research institutes
are another part of the pro-aid coalition in most donor countries. More than
half of French aid is tied to domestic enterprises and Japan has used its aid to
fund joint ventures and public works requiring employment ofJapanese firms.
The impetus of bureaucracies to maintain or expand their role is a major theme
in political analysis, well explained by Lancaster (1999).
As cold war rivalry subsided, it created a permissive environment that increased
the bargaining strength of remaining donors. The imposition of structural
adjustment conditionality in Africa in the 1980s was facilitated by this
weakening of manoeuver room for recipients (van de Walle 1998). With no
pressures from competing rivals, aid has been delinked from prestige or alliance
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considerations. Economic need and prospective performance rise in comparative
salience.
20 In 1998-9 the Congo experienced an internal armed conflict with the added
fighting among nine armies, eight from neighbouring states: Rwanda, Uganda,
Burundi, Angola, Namibia, Sudan, Chad and Zimbabwe.
21 The New York Times ( 1999) reported that only two of 29 eligible countries under
the World Bank-IMF Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief initiative
had received debt relief after the plan had been announced two and a half years
earlier. The World Bank promoted debt relief as a way to fight poverty, and
estimated that the cost to donors of waiting one year grew by 30 per cent.
22 African Finance Ministers recognised the dramatic negative impact of capital
flight on development, and resolved to 'take the necessary steps to stem and
reverse capital flight, including preventing macroeconomic policy lapses or
policy inconsistencies, which are likely to trigger, or contribute to capital flight'
(ECA 1999).

